Why the Mercedes Recall Keeps Growing: How the Absence of Error Management Became a Risk

The recall of the electric models Mercedes-Benz EQA and Mercedes-Benz EQB illustrates how technical problems can be amplified by organizational weaknesses. Around 53,000 vehicles worldwide are affected after several vehicle fires were reported, and an initially planned software solution apparently failed to fully eliminate the problem.

However, the case is not merely a technical challenge for Mercedes-Benz—it also raises questions about internal error management. In safety-critical industries, a structured Human Error Management System is considered a central component of modern risk governance. Its purpose is to ensure that human decision errors are identified early, systematically analyzed, and mitigated through organizational safeguards.

The developments surrounding EQA and EQB suggest that several decisions along the process chain—from risk assessment to solution strategy and communication—might have unfolded differently if a more institutionalized system for analyzing human decision errors had been in place. A chronological review highlights the points at which such structures might have prevented the escalation of the situation.

Phase 1: First Signs of Battery Problems – Lack of a Systematic Error Culture

The first warning signals came from isolated vehicle fires involving the EQA and EQB electric models. In several cases, investigations indicated that the high-voltage battery might have been involved.

In safety-critical industries—such as aviation or nuclear power—such incidents would immediately trigger a comprehensive human-error analysis process. This approach does not only examine the technical aspects but also evaluates:

decision-making processes,
risk assessments,
internal communication pathways, and
potential organizational misjudgments.

This is where the difference between simple troubleshooting and systemic error management often becomes evident. While technical causes are investigated, the question of potential human decision errors in development or approval processes frequently remains secondary.

In the case of the electric platform used by Mercedes-Benz, such a systemic analysis might have led to stricter safety measures at an earlier stage.

Phase 2: The Recall – Focus on Damage Control Rather Than Root Causes

As indications of potential battery issues accumulated, Mercedes initiated a global recall affecting roughly 53,000 vehicles of the EQA and EQB models.

Recalls themselves are common instruments within the automotive industry’s quality management systems. What ultimately matters, however, is which type of solution strategy is chosen.

At this stage, a pattern often observed in organizations without strongly institutionalized human-error management becomes visible:

rapid operational response,
minimal technical intervention, and
efforts to limit financial impact.

Instead of implementing structural changes to the hardware, the manufacturer initially opted for a software-based solution. While this strategy is understandable in principle, it carries the risk that the underlying cause is not fully addressed.

A systematic human-error management approach might have raised critical questions such as:

Were the risks potentially underestimated?
Were internal warning signals insufficiently weighted?
Was a lower-cost solution favored over a technically more robust one?

Phase 3: Software Update as a Solution – A Classic Misjudgment

The first concrete countermeasure was an update to the vehicles’ battery management system.

The software was intended to:

reduce peak stress loads on the battery,
monitor temperature development more closely,
prevent critical charging states, and
provide stronger electronic protection for the battery.

From a technical perspective, this strategy appears plausible. However, it rests on a key assumption: that the problem is primarily related to control systems rather than hardware.

This is precisely the point at which a human-error management system would normally intervene. Such systems are designed to prevent organizations from committing too early to a single explanation—a phenomenon known in error research as “premature closure.”

Without structured counter-review mechanisms, companies may become convinced of a hypothesis too quickly.

Phase 4: New Fires – The Original Assumption Collapses

The critical turning point came when additional fire incidents were reported despite the installation of the software update.

As a result, the initial strategy came under significant pressure. Eventually, Mercedes-Benz acknowledged that the update “cannot completely eliminate the risk of fire in rare individual cases.”

From the perspective of modern safety research, this is precisely the moment when the limits of a purely technical solution become visible.

An effective human-error management system might already have systematically examined:

whether the original hypothesis could be incorrect,
whether alternative causal models had been sufficiently considered, and
whether a more conservative safety approach was necessary.

Without such organizational mechanisms, companies often react only when external events—such as new incidents—contradict their original assumptions.

Phase 5: Strategic Reversal – Hardware Suddenly Becomes an Option

Once it became clear that the software solution might not be sufficiently effective, a far more drastic measure came into focus: replacing battery modules or even entire battery packs.

This step might have been considered from the outset. However, in many organizations a combination of cost logic, time pressure, and internal decision structures prevents more radical solutions from being seriously evaluated at an early stage.

This is precisely where human-error management plays a role: it structures decision-making processes in a way that prevents cognitive biases and organizational pressures from automatically leading to suboptimal solutions.

Phase 6: Potential Costs – A Case Study in Organizational Error

If a large-scale battery replacement ultimately becomes necessary, the financial implications for Mercedes-Benz could be substantial.

The high-voltage battery is the most expensive component of an electric vehicle. Depending on the vehicle, replacing it can cost between €10,000 and more than €20,000.

With approximately 53,000 affected vehicles, the potential financial exposure could reach several hundred million euros.

Beyond the direct costs, additional burdens could arise:

global workshop capacity requirements,
complex logistics for high-voltage batteries,
potential replacement vehicles for customers, and
long-term reputational damage.

Many organizational researchers see the core problem precisely here: technical failures are often costly—but organizational decision errors can multiply those costs exponentially.

Conclusion: A Technical Problem—and an Organizational One

The recall surrounding the Mercedes-Benz EQA and Mercedes-Benz EQB highlights not only the technological challenges of electric mobility but also the importance of organizational structures in managing risk.

In industries with particularly high safety requirements—such as aviation or aerospace—human-error management systems have long been standard practice. These systems systematically analyze:

decision-making processes,
organizational incentive structures,
communication failures, and
cognitive biases in risk assessment.

The case involving Mercedes-Benz demonstrates how the absence of such a structured approach can allow problems to escalate step by step—from early warning signals and an overly optimistic software solution to the prospect of an expensive hardware correction.

In that sense, the recall represents more than just a technical episode. It may ultimately serve as an example of why systematic human-error management will likely play a far greater role in the future of electric mobility.